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Abstract—We introduce LOCATHE (Location-Enhanced 
Authenticated Key Exchange), a generic protocol that pools 
location, user attributes, access policy and desired services into a 
multi-factor authentication, allowing two peers to establish a 
secure, encrypted session and perform mutual authentication with 
pre-shared keys, passwords and other authentication factors. 
LOCATHE contributes to: (1) forward secrecy through 
ephemeral session keys; (2) security through zero-knowledge 
password proofs (ZKPP), such that no passwords can be learned 
from the exchange; (3) the ability to use not only location, but also 
multiple authentication factors from a user to a service; (4) 
providing a two-tiered privacy authentication scheme, in which a 
user may be authenticated either based on her attributes (hiding 
her unique identification), or with a full individual authentication; 
(5) employing the expressiveness and flexibility of Decentralized 
or Multi-Authority Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based 
Encryption, allowing multiple service providers to control their 
respective key generation and attributes. 
Index Terms—protocol; authenticated key exchange; attribute-
based encryption; security; location awareness; authentication; 
Bluetooth low energy 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The most common form of user authentication to devices and 
services is the typical username/password pair. Although 
omnipresent, this pair might not be the most secure method of 
authentication, as it must strike a balance between “strong” 
security (i.e., having a long, random password) and not 
becoming excruciating to the user (i.e., allowing the user to 
remember the password and keeping the process of entering or 
typing it into the device at least moderately painless). This 
balance is however not trivial, in particular when a user is 
registered to dozens of websites/applications, and mobile 
devices, equipped with touch screens, do not yet offer the best 
experience when entering complex, random, long passwords [1]. 
Multi-factor authentication (MFA) is a mechanism that 
improves the security of passwords by combining more pieces 
of authentication, generally shared through diverse channels. 
Examples of MFA include token authenticators, SMS codes, and 
PINs. The combination may allow the user to manage simpler 
bits of authentication without loss of security. In [2], location 
was propositioned as a form of authentication, considering that, 
while utilizing a mobile device to interact with some service, the 
user is physically present at a “legitimate” place. If the user is 
indeed present at that expected location, then this information 
can be utilized as an authentication factor to services, i.e., in-
store payment, check-ins, system access (log-on), etc. 
Here, we propose LOCATHE (pronounced “locate”), a 
Location-Enhanced Authenticated Key Exchange, a generic 
protocol that combines location, user attributes, access policy 
and desired services as multi-factor authentication factors to 
allow two parties to establish an encrypted, secure session and 
further perform mutual authentication with pre-shared keys, 
passwords and other authentication factors. The combination of 
many factors may allow the user to manage simpler bits of 
authentication without loss of security. LOCATHE significantly 
improves on [2] and offers the following features: (1) forward 
secrecy through ephemeral session keys, such that past 
exchanges cannot be compromised if pre-shared keys or 
passwords are; (2) security through zero-knowledge password 
proofs (ZKPP), such that no passwords can be learned from the 
exchange; (3) the ability to use not only location, but also 
multiple authentication factors from a user to a service, and 
services are also authenticated to a user; (4) providing a two-
tiered privacy authentication scheme, in which a user may be 
authenticated based only on her attributes (such that the user 
cannot be uniquely identified), or with a full individual 
authentication; (5) employing the expressiveness and flexibility 
of Multi-Authority Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based 
Encryption (CP-ABE) [3] and permitting that multiple service 
providers control their respective key generation and attributes. 
LOCATHE applies perfectly to the use case depicted in [2]. 
In Section II, we survey related work in authenticated key 
exchanges and location-enabled authentication. We present the 
LOCATHE protocol in Section III by utilizing, as an instance of 
location hardware, Bluetooth Low Energy beacons. The threat 
model and security of LOCATHE under several attack vectors 
is discussed in Section IV, and we conclude and comment on 
future directions in Section V. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Diffie-Hellman-Merkle’s seminal work [4], along with 
Ralph Merkle’s puzzles [5], not only introduced the fundaments 
of public-key cryptography, but also gave one of the earliest 
examples of key-agreement protocols based on public key 
encryption, although the original idea was a non-authenticated 
key exchange. Subsequent work builds upon the Diffie-Hellman 
(D-H) exchange to offer authenticated key-exchange (AKE) 
protocols, or the family of Encrypted Key Exchange protocols 
based on the design of [6]. IKEv2 [7] is part of IPsec and 
provides mutual authentication between peers, forward secrecy 
through session keys and ways to encapsulate traffic. To address 
the alleged complexities of IKE, Just Fast Keying (JFK) [8] 
claims to achieve resistance to denial-of-service attacks, 
efficiency and simplicity by avoiding complex negotiations and 
not intending to offer perfect forward secrecy, but instead a 
balance between forward secrecy and efficiency through 
forward secrecy intervals, outside of which security associations 
are protected. In addition, the identities of parties are not 
revealed to unauthorized participants. In LOCATHE, we assume 
that the identity of the broadcaster is public (the first message is 
a broadcast from a known serviced location), and the identity of 
the user is further obscured to non-parties by session encryption, 
and to the service itself in one of LOCATHE’s modes of privacy 
authentication. LOCATHE always provides forward secrecy. 
Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) 
[9] is a ZKPP protocol intended to establish a mutually 
authenticated, encrypted (with strong session keys) channel 
between two parties utilizing short passwords for machine 
readable travel documents. PACE has been proposed to operate 
with IKEv2 [10] and accepts short keys or passwords for 
authentication. LOCATHE supports these short methods of 
authentication, augmented by the location factor. Another 
protocol, namely Secure Remote Password (SRP) [11], offers a 
verifier-based, perfect-forward-secrecy authentication in which 
a server stores an asymmetric form of a password (the verifier), 
such that leakage of the server password database provides no 
feasible way for an attacker to derive the actual password, or 
utilize the verifier to authenticate. Attribute-Based 
Authenticated Key Exchange (AB-AKE) [12] introduces the 
concept of using ABE in conjunction with AKE, in which all of 
the multiple parties taking part in the communication must 
satisfy the access policy specified by the administrator (and built 
within the encryption itself). The authors warn, however, that 
their protocol does not provide forward secrecy, although they 
suggest constructions that may achieve that feature. In [13], an 
RF transmitter mounted in a wristwatch is utilized to provide 
continuous authentication to nearby devices through  symmetric 
cryptography. The system architecture provides a non-
anonymous and a pseudo-anonymous (or semi-anonymous) 
authentication, and the authors provide a security analysis by 
describing the behavior of the system under a number of attack 
models. In particular, the authors mention mafia fraud and 
terrorist attacks, wherein attackers attempt to deceive the system 
using spoofed locations. The authors acknowledge thwarting 
these attacks are not trivial; in LOCATHE, we present 
mechanisms to mitigate the possibility of some of these location-
spoofing attacks. 
A location-enabled authentication system is proposed in [2], 
by utilizing ABE-encrypted broadcast messages and token-
authenticator algorithms to provide encrypted authentication 
using location as an additional factor. This paper offers 
substantial contributions in addition to that work, in which a 
generic protocol is delineated to provide ZKPP, forward secrecy 
and protection against significant attack vectors. In [14], a 
detailed performance analysis on running ABE-based 
cryptography in smartphones is studied. The authors conclude 
these current devices do offer reasonable performance with ABE 
cryptosystems. 
III. LOCATHE, LOCATION-ENHANCED AUTHENTICATED 
KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL 
In this section, we describe the construction of the 
LOCATHE protocol and its security components. LOCATHE is 
a peer-to-peer protocol, building upon robust procedures from 
                                                          
1 We assume “proximity” as being in the same room, or the same office 
floor, or the same store, a delimited space that gives a person a psychological 
notion of belonging to the same “area.” 
IKEv2 and PACE [7, 10], and expands the work in [2]. The 
authentication protocol is divided into three stages (Broadcast, 
Privacy Authentication, and Exchange Authentication/Long 
Term Key Generation) and involves pairs of messages (a request 
and a response) plus one initial broadcast exchanged between 
two parties. The usage scenario is a user (one peer) who wants 
to authenticate using her present location as an authentication 
factor to a service (the other peer) within her proximity 1 . 
Location is inferred through the ability of the user in decrypting 
an ABE-encrypted broadcast (transmitted by Bluetooth 
beacons) and interactions through the protocol beginning with 
the broadcast. The user possesses a mobile device running an 
application, named the user agent. A Location-Enabled 
Authentication Service [2] agent (which we will subsequently 
name Service in this paper) within the user’s location runs 
LOCATHE and acts on behalf of third-party service providers, 
named Relying-Parties (RPs)2. In this description, the Service 
Agent running LOCATHE acts as the responder, identified by 
the letter r, and the user agent (which also runs the protocol) acts 
as the initiator, identified by the letter i. We adopt this 
convention even though the very first message is in fact an ABE-
encrypted broadcast message sent by the Service Agent, but 
consider the user the interested party who wants to authenticate. 
We utilize the Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral 
(ECDHE) scheme for the key exchange operations, however the 
protocol may be modified to allow for the use of Ephemeral 
Diffie-Hellman modular (EDH) exchanges. The use of ECDHE 
provides robust security with comparable smaller key sizes, 
which is advantageous to mobile devices. Moreover, in Privacy 
Authentication stage (to be detailed later), LOCATHE allows 
the user agent to select between two privacy modes or tiers. In 
the Tier 1 mode, the user is only identified and authenticated to 
the Service based on her ability to fulfill the ABE access policy, 
and no individual user credentials are provided to the Service. In 
the Tier 2 mode, the user agent proceeds with a full 
authentication such that the Service individually identifies her, 
and may thus offer an augmented set of benefits. 
A. Registration 
Prior to authenticating, a user and the Service need to 
exchange data such that they may know and validate each other 
in subsequent interactions, and agree on security parameters. 
This is the registration phase, wherein a user registers with the 
Service running LOCATHE and exchanges security parameters 
such as the Service’s public key, the user’s ABE secret key and 
attributes, the seed and clock for the token authenticator 
algorithm, base point G for ECDHE, key-derivation function 
(KDF) salts, and a secret shared user key (UserKey). UserKey is 
a high-entropy key generated by the Service (not the user 
password), is typically unique per user device and can also be 
unique per Relying Party application. This user key expires per 
policy requirements, e.g., within 15 days, after which the user 
re-registers with the Service and acquires renewed credentials. 
This procedure addresses the issue of key update; a user’s set of 
secret and shared keys are valid through a time period, after 
which the Service may expire them in its database, requiring the 
user to update them with re-registration. The ABE access policy 
2  For instance, MasterCard wishes to utilize the Location-Enabled 
Authentication Service running LOCATHE for in-store purchases within some 
store. MasterCard is thus the Relying-Party payment service provider. 
might include special attributes that are updated periodically, 
such that users will need to acquire those attributes every so 
often in order to decrypt broadcasts within the validity period. 
We consider, with scalability advantages, the usage of 
Decentralized CP-ABE [3], wherein Services may perform their 
own registrations and issue their ABE secret keys to users in a 
manner independent of other service instances, besides common 
reference parameters. 
B. Broadcast/ECDHE Stage 
This stage corresponds to the broadcast of an ABE encrypted 
message, which furnishes both the authentication information 
needed for the next stage, and the exchange of session ECDHE 
public keys (Fig. 1 [a]). For the broadcast message, the Service 
picks a random nonce, Nb, which is unique per location (beacon 
range) and per time interval, and encrypts it using ABE with a 
chosen access policy, resulting in the BNONCE. (We avoid 
using pedix characters as possible to improve visualization 
within the figures.) 
The Service further signs the BNONCE and broadcasts the 
BNONCE and the signature, and may also add its certificate to 
the broadcast. The random nonce Nb is regenerated periodically, 
triggering a new signature and broadcast. The interval between 
broadcasts is configurable to attain a balance between proper 
location accuracy, overhead and security (beacon intervals in, 
e.g., IEEE 801.11, are typically 100 TU, in which 1 TU = 1024 
microseconds). For Bluetooth LE beacons, there is a size limit 
for the broadcast message. Typically, Bluetooth LE devices in 
advertising mode may contain a data payload of up to 31 octets 
[15], which is generally not sufficient for an ABE encrypted 
message. Therefore, the broadcast phase might require that the 
user agent, upon detecting the broadcast, establishes a 
connection with the Bluetooth LE beacon device to acquire the 
full ABE broadcast. As the user agent intercepts the ABE 
broadcast, it now becomes the initiator (i). The user agent 
verifies the BNONCE signature and, if the broadcaster is hence 
validated, attempts to decrypt BNONCE with the user’s ABE 
secret key (ABE_sk). If the user has attributes that fulfill the 
access policy encapsulated within the broadcast BNONCE, then 
the user obtains Nb, defines an ECDHE value KEi and a random 
nonce Ni, and sends Ni and KEi to the Service. The Service 
responds with its own ECDHE value KEr and a random nonce 
Nr. Note that the values KEi and KEr are each calculated from 
the ECDHE multiplication of a secret random integer and the 
base point G. For instance, if the user agent picks a secret 
random integer ki, then ܭܧ݅ = ݇݅ ∗ ܩ. 
C. Tier 1 Privacy Authentication 
The Privacy Authentication stage comprises either a Tier 1 
or a Tier 2 Privacy authentication. At Tier 1, both user and 
Service can compute the SharedSecret, KeySeed, and derive the 
session keys SK_e and SK_a as portrayed in Fig. 1 (b). SK_e is 
a secret key for encryption and SK_a, for authentication, and 
there is a different set of SK_e and SK_a keys for each direction 
of communications. Thus, the user agent (i) utilizes keys SK_ei 
and SK_ai when sending messages to the Service (r), and the 
Service utilizes its set of (r) keys accordingly. The 
pseudorandom functions prf and prf+ are defined in [7], and 
SPIi and SPIr are unique connection identifiers resembling the 
SPI indexes in [16]. The SK_p keys are utilized in calculating 
the <SignedOctets> data that goes within the AUTH_TIER1 
payloads. The <SignedOctets> data is based on the similar field 
in [10], however, in this tier the user agent may not provide its 
personal identification for privacy purposes. Additional keying 
material can be derived alongside the SK keys if necessary for 
alternative implementations of the protocol. 
The user agent utilizes its session keys to encrypt and send 
its AUTH_TIER1_i to the Service (r). This AUTH_TIER1_i 
payload is produced from a combination of hashes of Nb, the 
nonces exchanged during Broadcast/ECDHE, <SignedOctets> 
(which includes SK_p and Nr) and the public ECDHE key KEr. 
This computation, which also obscures Nb, further mitigates 
replay and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, as we analyze in 
later sections. The user agent may include optional requests such 
as desired services. Upon receiving the message, the Service 
computes the expected AUTH_TIER1_i and compares it with 
the user’s. If matched, the user is authenticated in the Tier 1 
privacy mode, i.e., the Service knows the user has the necessary 
attributes to fulfill the access policy, but does not know who the 
user is. The Service further computes its own AUTH_TIER1_r 
in a similar way, but also signs it with its PKI secret key and 
sends it to the user along the Service’s identification and 
certificate, completing the Tier 1 Authentication. 
D. Tier 2 Privacy Authentication 
In this mode, the user utilizes her secret keys or password to 
authenticate herself to the Service (Fig. 1 [c]). The procedure at 
1b was constructed such that it can be applied in substitution of 
Tier 1 sequences. However, in fact nothing forbids the parties 
from executing both Tier 1 and Tier 2 authentications. 
As in the Tier 1 mode, both parties compute and derive their 
session keys and additional SK keys. To perform the individual 
authentication, the user agent retrieves the shared secret user key 
(UserKey) exchanged during registration and modifies it to a 
Spwd (Stored PassWorD) and then to a Kpwd (Key from 
PassWorD), according to Fig. 1 (c). The UserKey is never stored 
in the user device, but the Spwd  version of it; Spwd is in fact 
calculated during the registration process. Alternatively, an 
entered user password can be utilized, such that it is properly 
converted into an appropriate UserKey through a KDF [17, 18] 
(the Service running LOCATHE again does not store, or know, 
the plaintext of a user password) and processed through Spwd 
and Kpwd. The Spwd/Kpwd modifications result in a long, high-
entropy key that ultimately depends on the random, ephemeral 
sessions nonces exchanged in the Broadcast stage. The user 
agent next picks a random nonce s and encrypts it with the 
generated Kpwd, producing ENONCE. This specific encryption 
is done in a non-authenticated mode [19], i.e., the encryption 
does not generate a Message Authentication Code (MAC). This 
requirement intends to avoid offline password attacks, in which 
an attacker mounts the attacks by intercepting the broadcast 
messages and running them through a decryption oracle. This 
decryption oracle is simply an automated program that attempts 
decryption using several choices of passwords (and derived 
Spwd/Kpwd keys). If s is encrypted in the authenticated-
encryption mode, then the attacker can easily verify whether the 
decryption was successful for each attempted password, 
regardless of the contents of the resulting plaintext. This is 
because the decryption oracle or program either accepts (in 
which case the secret key was found) or rejects decryption, since 
the MAC would be invalid for the attempted key. The user 
further computes GE based on s and the previously calculated 
SharedSecret and creates a pair LSK_i and LPK_i, which are, 
respectively, the secret and public user keys for Tier 2 
authentication. The user then encrypts (with the session keys) 
the ENONCE, her user ID (IDi), AUTH_TIER2_i (which is a 
proof of knowledge of the broadcast Nb and exchanged data so 
far) and LPK_i, and sends all of them to the Service. The 
UserKey or user password are never sent over the medium, even 
in encrypted form; the protocol provides a zero-knowledge 
password proof of it through ENONCE. The Service verifies the 
user ID and similarly retrieves Spwd and generates Kpwd from 
the associated UserKey, thus being able to decrypt ENONCE. It 
utilizes the obtained random nonce s to compute GE and its pair 
of secret and public keys LSK_r and PSK_r. It then encrypts and 
sends its ID parameters/certificate (IDr) and its public key 
LPK_r to the user agent, along with possible requests for 
additional authentication factors. When the user agent provides 
additional authentication factors, each of these factors should be 
converted into strong keys as demonstrated by the Spwd/Kpwd 
construction. If the retrieved s is different from that used by the 
user agent (due to a potential successful malicious attack), the 
resulting GE and key pairs will differ from the expected values 
and cause a failure in the authentication in the next stage. 
E. Exchange Authentication/Long Term Key Generation 
In this final stage (Fig. 1 [d]), the parties further authenticate 
themselves and the exchanges so far, and finally compute a long 
term shared key that can be utilized in new location 
authentications and potential session hand-offs, such as 
transferring the session from Bluetooth LE to Wi-Fi. If the 
Service has requested additional authentication factors from the 
user agent, such as extra passwords, tokens, PINs or biometric 
data, they are sent in this step. We utilize, as an example, a token 
authenticator (tk)-generated number. The GTK number is 
computed from the tk number and the ECDHE point GE, such 
that the actual tk is never sent from the user agent to the Service. 
The user agent computes AuthSharedSecret from its secret 
LSK_i and the received Service’s public LPK_r, and then 
generates the authentication data AUTHi. The 
<SignedOctets_i> data is based on the similar field in [10]. The 
user agent then sends AUTHi to the Service. The Service 
computes GTK (since the Service shares the same seed, clock 
and token authenticator algorithm with the user, it can generate 
the same numbers at the same time), AuthSharedSecret and its 
AUTHr data in a similar fashion, and then verifies the received 
AUTHi. If this final authentication is valid, the Service proceeds 
to send its AUTHr to the user agent and compute the long-term 
secret key LongTermSecret, which may be stored and substitute 
UserKey in further Tier 2 authentications. LongTermSecret shall 
expire within 1 hour of creation, following the guidelines 
suggested in [10]. The user agent, upon receiving and verifying 
AUTHr, also computes LongTermSecret. Both the AUTH 
values and the LongTermSecret are tied to the ephemeral, 
random values created during the location-enabled 
authentication session. 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND THREAT MODEL 
We provide in this section a descriptive analysis of the 
behavior of LOCATHE under different attack vectors. The 
threat model is constructed as a game with three players, each 
named (as tradition) as Alice, Bob, Mallory: the Service Agent 
running LOCATHE protocol (Alice) and a user (Bob) are 
legitimate peers who wish to establish a location-enabled 
authenticated communication. Mallory is a malicious attacker; 
she is modeled as being able to listen to, record and replay the 
exchanges between Alice and Bob, or communicate directly 
with Alice and/or Bob (thus, being passive or active) with 
messages of her choosing. Mallory knows no pre-shared secret 
keys nor passwords, and wins the game if she is able to 
determine confidential information exchanged between Alice 
and Bob with non-negligible probability, or successfully 
authenticate herself as either Alice or Bob. 
A. Eavesdropping 
In this attack, Mallory passively listens to the exchanges 
between Alice and Bob and attempts to learn confidential data 
encrypted by the session keys, ABE encryption, or pre-shared 
keys. The only information Mallory is able to read is the public 
ECDHE keys and public nonces, which are not encrypted. After 
the Broadcast stage, all exchanges are encrypted with ECDHE 
ephemeral keys that Mallory cannot derive as long as the 
assumption holds that an attacker cannot solve the Elliptic Curve 
Discrete Logarithm Problem. Moreover, even if Mallory 
 
Fig. 1: The stages and request/response messages of the LOCATHE protocol. 
User Agent (i)
Send SK_e,ai(AUTH_TIER1_i, [desired services, …])
Send SK_e,ar(IDr, Certificate, AUTH_TIER1_r, 
Sig(AUTH_TIER1_r))
Authentication Tier 1:
AUTH_TIER1_i=prf(prf+(Ni | Nr, 
“LocAuth Tier_1” | Nb), 
<SignedOctets_i> | KEr)
Authentication Tier 1:
Compute and verify AUTH_TIER1_i.
AUTH_TIER1_r=prf(prf+(Ni | Nr, “LocAuth Tier_1” | Nb), 
<SignedOctets_r> | KEi)
Service Agent (r)
(b) Tier 1 Privacy Authentication
(c) Tier 2 Privacy Authentication Authentication Tier 2:
Spwd = prf(“LocAuth Tier_2”, UserKey)
Kpwd = prf+(Ni | Nr, Spwd)
s = random
ENONCE = Encrypt_Kpwd(s)  // non-
authenticated.
GE = s*G + SharedSecret
AUTH_TIER2_i=prf(prf+(Ni | Nr, “LocAuth 
Tier_2” | Nb), <SignedOctets_i> | KEr)
Create pair LSK_i, LPK_i // (LPK_i = LSK_i 
* GE)
Send SK_e,ai(ENONCE, IDi, LPK_i, AUTH_TIER2_i)
Verify IDi, AUTH_TIER2_i.
Spwd = prf(“LocAuth Tier_2”, UserKey)
Kpwd = prf+(Ni | Nr, Spwd)
GE = s*G + SharedSecret
Create pair LSK_r, LPK_r // (LPK_r = LSK_r * GE)
Send SK_e,ar(IDr, LPK_r, [additional auth. requests])
Send SK_e,ai(AUTHi) GTK = TokenAuthenticator * GE
AuthSharedSecret = LSK_i * LPK_r
AUTHi = prf(prf+(Ni | Nr, 
AuthSharedSecret), GTK | 
<SignedOctets_i> | LPK_r)
LongTermSecret = prf(Ni | Nr, “LocAuth 
LongTermSecret”| AuthSharedSecret)
LongTermSecret will be utilized as the 
new pre-shared secret between parties. 
LongTermSecret should expire within 
one hour, and can be utilized in 
handoffs to other network media or 
subsequent authentications to other 
cells.
GTK = TokenAuthenticator * GE
AuthSharedSecret = LSK_r * LPK_i
Verify AUTHi with GTK.
AUTHr = prf(prf+(Ni | Nr, AuthSharedSecret), GTK | 
<SignedOctets_r> | LPK_i)
LongTermSecret = prf(Ni | Nr, “LocAuth 
LongTermSecret”| AuthSharedSecret)
Send SK_e,ar(AUTHr) Verify AUTHr. Exchange authenticated,
continue with communication.
(d) Exchange Authentication/Long Term Key Generation
Send KEi, Ni
Pick random nonce Nb.
BNONCE=ABE(AccessPolicy, Nb)
Sign BNONCE Becomes initiator!
Verify Sign(BNONCE).
Decrypt BNONCE using ABE_sk, 
get Nb.
Pick ECDHE value KEi = ki * G.
Pick random nonce Ni.Pick ECDHE value KEr = kr * G.
Pick random nonce Nr.
Send KEr, Nr
User agent registers with LocAuth, exchanges public key, ABE secret 
keys, attributes, seed/clock for token authenticator algorithm.
Broacast
Common:
SharedSecret = ki * kr * G = ki * KEr = kr * KEi
KeySeed = prf(Ni | Nr, SharedSecret)
{SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er | SK_pi | SK_pr | … } = prf+(KeySeed, Ni | Nr | SPIi, SPIr)
(a) Broadcast/ECDHE
successfully learns some pre-shared secret, she cannot decrypt 
past sessions, and even learning one session key does not 
provide the ability to decrypt the other direction of exchanges, 
giving the protocol forward secrecy. 
B. Man in the Middle Attack (MITM) 
A non-authenticated Diffie-Hellman exchange is susceptible 
to active attackers, i.e., attackers who are capable of intercepting 
the ECDHE values and substitute them with their own values. 
Effectively, in MITM, Mallory may intercept the initial ECDHE 
values send by Alice and Bob, sending her own computed 
ECDHE values and establishing two encrypted sessions (with 
dissimilar keys), one between Alice and Mallory, and one 
between Mallory and Bob. LOCATHE, however, utilizes 
authentication in different stages to repel the MITM attack, and 
the parties never send keys or passwords. The initial broadcast 
consists of the encrypted, temporary random nonce Nb with 
ABE, which Mallory cannot obtain without breaking the ABE 
encryption; this Nb is further utilized to produce authentication 
data in the Privacy Authentication steps that ties crucial 
ephemeral values exchanged between the parties. Without Nb, 
the resulting invalid data prevents mutual authentication. Since 
the actual value Nb is never sent back to the originator, but a 
hash-function transformation of it, Mallory cannot learn the 
original Nb. Finally, the encrypted Nb is signed by the Service 
(Alice), allowing the user agent (Bob) to reject tampering. 
Moreover, in Tier 2 Privacy authentication, a shared secret 
key and a second-factor token authenticator validate the user 
agent in a ZKPP exchange with the Service. In the last stage, 
additional authentication fields are constructed with exchanged 
and derived data that cannot (but with negligible probability) be 
obtained, or provided, by the attacker without resulting in invalid 
authentication values that both Alice and Bob reject. Unless 
Mallory is able to compromise pre-shared and the ABE secret 
keys (in which case all security is lost), Mallory cannot 
impersonate Alice nor Bob, and LOCATHE rejects this attack. 
C. Replay Attack 
Here, Mallory listens to and record transmissions between 
Alice (Service) and Bob (legitimate user), and later replays her 
recordings in the same location. (Replays in a different location 
are addressed next as wormhole attacks.) Mallory can choose 
which recording and which time to replay, and she wins the 
game if she successfully impersonates Alice or Bob, or learns 
confidential information. Aforementioned mechanisms also 
thwart replay attacks, in particular the ephemeral, random values 
that are utilized to generate shared secrets, challenges and 
authentication payloads. Simply replaying the other party of an 
exchange with an active Alice or Bob has negligible probability 
of success, since the legitimate party must choose the exact same 
random values occurred in the replayed session, such that an 
exact reproduction of a past exchange ensues. In particular, we 
emphasize the initial Nb broadcast and the token authenticator 
in Tier 2 authentication. The Nb broadcast is unique per location 
and continually regenerated by Alice. Let ݐ be the time in which 
Alice broadcasts the ABE-encrypted message ݉; let ݀ be the 
time interval within which Alice considers ݉ valid; and let ߜ be 
a real number such that ߜ > 0. We identify two sub-cases: (a) 
Mallory replays the Nb broadcast in time ݐ + ݀ + ߜ (outside the 
valid time interval); and (b) Mallory replays the broadcast in 
time ݐᇱ ≤ ݐ + ݀ (within the valid period). In case (a), Bob will 
still respond to the replayed message (since it appears valid to 
Bob) and may complete the Broadcast/ECDHE stage with either 
Alice or Mallory. In the Privacy Authentication steps, Bob sends 
his authentication payload constructed with Nb to Alice or 
Mallory. The current broadcast message by Alice will contain a 
different random value, say Nb’. The difference will result in 
invalid authentication payloads from Bob, which Alice rejects. 
Mallory cannot successfully establish an ECDHE encrypted 
session with Bob, past the Broadcast step, or decrypt the session 
with non-negligible probability just by replaying past responses. 
In case (b), Bob will either (i) reply to it for the first time if he 
has not yet heard the original broadcast, in which case the reply 
will be captured by Alice who will then continue with a valid 
exchange with Bob, or (ii) if Bob has already replied to this same 
broadcast, he will simply disregard it as a duplicate. Not shown 
in the figures, a message counter mechanism allows the parties 
to identify and reject duplicates. Finally, Tier 2 authentication 
includes a token authenticator, which generates diverse, 
temporary values only known by Alice and Bob, mitigating 
replay attacks. If Mallory instead replays messages from Bob to 
Alice, it is easy to verify that the same protocol behavior occurs. 
D. Wormhole Attack 
The setup for the wormhole attack comprises two locations, 
l and p, wherein messages transmitted in one location cannot 
normally be heard at the other. Both locations have a “local” 
Alice, i.e., LOCATHE service beacons. Mallory listens to 
exchange messages between Alice and Bob at location l, and she 
has a direct network connection through a secondary channel to 
location p. Mallory wins the game if she successfully gains 
authentication with the Service at location p, by replaying the 
interactions or responses from Bob to the local Alice at l. That 
is, Mallory attempts to replay legitimate interactions from 
location l to gain authentication with the Service at another 
location p. 
If the Service at location p receives messages from Bob who 
is interacting with the Alice beacon at location l, there is 
negligible probability that the SPI indexes and the encrypted 
broadcasts at both locations are exact matches. If they are not, 
authentication payloads will be invalid, and thus the Service at 
p rejects authentication. Alternatively, Nb may contain location 
or beacon ID data, facilitating matching responses to broadcast 
originators. 
A different wormhole attack may be performed if Mallory 
can listen and replay messages between locations l and p. In this 
case, Alice is at l, and Bob is at p, and there is no “local” Alice 
Service at p. Mallory is, thus, effectively extending the range of 
location l to location p through her network connection. 
LOCATHE does not protect against this form of attack, 
assuming Bob has no other location-identifier hardware. 
E. Denial of Service (DoS) Attack 
Mallory performs a DoS attack by either (a) replaying 
previously recorded messages, (b) transmitting bogus messages, 
or (c) transmitting radio noise (jamming) with such transmission 
power and constancy to disrupt legitimate communications 
between Alice and Bob. As described in [2, 20], Bluetooth 
frequency hopping mitigates radio jamming. The use of unique 
SPI connection indexes and message counters assist the parties 
in ignoring bogus or repeated messages, although there will still 
be overhead in detection. Not described in LOCATHE, [7, 21] 
suggests the use of cookies that may assist the Service in 
detecting and further rejecting repeated attempts of session 
initiation. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We introduced LOCATHE, a Location-Enhanced 
Authenticated Key Exchange protocol. LOCATHE permits 
capturing, through Attribute-Based Encryption-encrypted 
broadcasts, the dynamic association of location, user’s 
attributes, access policy and local service as multi-factor 
authentication such that two parties, a user and a service, can 
establish an encrypted, secure session and mutually authenticate 
with additional factors. Security features of LOCATHE include 
forward secrecy; zero-knowledge password proofs to avoid 
password or key leakages; use of strong keys; capability of 
accommodating multi-factor authentication; a two-tiered 
privacy authentication scheme, wherein a user can choose to be 
fully, individually authenticated, or authenticated without 
personal identification. The underlying Location-Enabled 
Authentication Service employs Multi-Authority CP-ABE, so 
that participating services and Relying Parties can control their 
own ABE secret key generation and update, and access policies. 
By generating a strong, long-term shared key, LOCATHE 
contributes a secure way for users to authenticate to different 
participating services with less user intervention, using the 
location/mobility information as a security factor. Our future 
work includes evaluating the performance of LOCATHE and its 
overhead, and investigating its security under extended attack 
vectors. Additional or alternative password-based authentication 
schemes will be analyzed, in particular verifier-based ones such 
as SRP. LOCATHE provides resources for key update and 
(implicit) revocation through periodic updates, however we plan 
to survey possible more efficient constructions. 
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